Seminar Event Detail

Theoretical Computer Science

Date:  Friday, October 23, 2015
Location:  3725 BBB (10:00 AM to 11:00 AM)

Title:  Peer Prediction and Mechanism Design

Abstract:   When we collect self-report surveys from people, people may not tell the truth. However, if we assume each person's private information is "informative" about his peers' private information, we can always use a framework called "peer prediction" to motivate people to tell the truth through additional payments, even when we cannot directly verify an agents answer. This talk will give a survey of related results using peer prediction based mechanisms in different settings. For example, if agents are asked to rate a restaurant, settings might include: when agents share an initial expectation about the restaurant, when the mechanism know this initial expectation as well, and when there are many or few agents.


Speaker:  Yuqing Kong
Institution:  U-M

Event Organizer:   Grant Schoenebeck    schoeneb


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