Seminar Event Detail

Financial/Actuarial Mathematics

Date:  Monday, March 05, 2018
Location:  1360 East Hall (4:00 PM to 5:00 PM)

Title:  On the (in)efficiency of mean field games.

Abstract:   Mean field games (MFG) are dynamic games with infinitely many infinitesimal agents. In this joint work with C. Rainer, we study the efficiency of Nash MFG equilibria: Namely, we compare the social cost of an MFG equilibrium with the minimal cost a global planner can achieve. We find a structure condition on the problem under which there exists efficient MFG equilibria and, in case this condition is not fulfilled, quantify how inefficient MFG equilibria are.


Speaker:  Pierre Cardaliguet
Institution:  Paris Dauphine

Event Organizer:     


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