Date: Wednesday, April 04, 2018
Location: 4096 East Hall (3:00 PM to 4:00 PM)
Title: Optimal Contract for a Fund Manager, with Capital Injections and Endogenous Constraints.
Abstract: In this paper, we construct a solution to the optimal contract problem for delegated portfolio management of the fistbest (risksharing) type. The novelty of our result is (i) in the robustness of the optimal contract with respect to perturbations of the wealth process (interpreted as capital injections), and (ii) in the more general form of principal's objective function, which is allowed to depend directly on the agent's strategy (which, in
turn, allows us to incorporate endogenous constraints in the contract). We reduce the optimal contract problem to the following inverse problem: for a given portfolio (defined in a feedback form, as a random field), construct a stochastic utility whose optimal portfolio coincides with the given one. We characterize the solution to this problem through a linear Stochastic Partial Differential Equation (SPDE), prove its wellposedness, and compute the solution explicitly in the BlackScholes model. Remarkably, the optimal contract computed in the BlackScholes model satisfies the limited liability condition and has additional properties which show that it also solves the secondbest (moral hazard) version of the problem, in which the principal cannot fully deduce the agent's strategy from her observations.
Files: 5262_OptContract.pdf
Speaker: Sergey Nadtochiy
Institution: UM
Event Organizer:
